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Introduction 
 
It is often claimed that poststructuralist or post-Marxist discourse theory suffers from a 
number of methodological deficits (e.g. Keller, 2013; Marttila, 2015; 2016). These pertain 
mainly to its alleged incapacity to explain phenomena, where explanation is usually couched 
in causal terms, and to develop meaningful research strategies that can justify the accounts it 
puts forward. At best, poststructuralist discourse theory can re-describe phenomena with its 
own categories, or at worst it is concerned to develop ‘high theory’ which does not connect 
easily to the empirical world. In Logics of Critical Explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), 
we respond to these charges by arguing that retroduction offers us a distinctive form of 
explanation within the context of poststructuralist discourse analysis, while the articulation of 
logics provides the means to flesh out the content of explanations made in its name. Here we 
focus on the form of explanation.  
 
We suggest that an appeal to retroductive reasoning as a form of explanation distinct from 
induction and deduction can help frame the strategic and methodological issues of any 
research that takes seriously an anti-essentialist ontology rooted in poststructuralist discourse 
theory. Anti-essentialism captures the view that societies and social agents – indeed, history 
itself – do not contain essences – invariable and fixed properties of an object - that can be 
rationally extracted and used to characterize social phenomena. At the same time, although 
prominent in debates over how best to understand the production of theories and hypotheses 
in the natural sciences, we also argue that the concept of retroduction is relevant to a set of 
debates in the philosophy of social science. More precisely, it offers theoretical resources to 
develop a post-positivist picture of the study of social and political phenomena, thus 
furnishing important elements of a feasible and critical research strategy. We draw on 
arguments associated with a poststructuralist discourse-theoretical approach to social and 
political research (Glynos & Howarth 2007) to justify adopting the idea of a retroductive 
‘cycle’. A retroductive understanding of the relationship between key elements of the social 
science research process offers us a useful way to think about research strategy and 
methodology from the point of view of post-positivism, including approaches informed by 
poststructuralist discourse theory. 
 
The Positivist Hegemony: Contexts of Discovery and Justification 
 
Many affirm a dualistic picture of natural scientific practice, whether they are philosophers of 
science or practitioners engaged in day-to-day scientific activities (Popper, 1961; 
Reichenbach, 1938). In this view, first there is a process of scientific discovery, which entails 
the production of a hypothesis or theory (the so-called ‘context of discovery’). And this is 
followed by careful empirical testing, whose aim is to justify the acceptance or rejection of a 
hypothesis or theory (the so-called ‘context of justification’). Philosophers of science can and 
often do disagree about the character of ‘proper’ science. For example, Hans Reichenbach – 
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usually identified as the first person to formalize the distinction between contexts of 
discovery and justification – suggested that establishing an inductive relation between 
empirical data and a discovered theory was the mark of a properly scientific mode of 
reasoning. A more common view, now rather dominant in the academy, suggests that the 
essence of scientific practice lies on the side of justification, not discovery. The idea here is 
that a process is to be understood as properly scientific only if a hypothesis has been 
subjected to rigorous and vigorous attempts to verify and/or falsify it. Only insofar as it has 
survived such tests can it be accepted as ‘scientific’, however provisionally, and thus be 
deployed legitimately to explain or predict phenomena through deduction. This idea is neatly 
and paradigmatically expressed by Karl Popper (1961: 135): 
 
[I]t is irrelevant from the point of view of science whether we have obtained our 
theories by jumping to unwarranted conclusions or merely by stumbling over them 
(that is, by ‘intuition’), or else by some inductive procedure. The question, ‘How 
did you first find your theory?’ relates, as it were, to an entirely private matter, as 
opposed to the question, ‘How did you test your theory?’ which alone is 
scientifically relevant. 
 
This picture of natural scientific practice can be readily deployed to generate a positivist 
picture of social scientific practice, at least insofar as positivism is understood to subscribe to 
the ideal of ‘unity of method’. For purposes of this text, then, we take positivism to be a 
doctrine comprising the following three components: 
 
(1) It affirms a two-part picture of natural scientific practice, comprising contexts of 
discovery and justification.  
(2) It dismisses the process of discovery as irrelevant from the point of view of natural 
scientific practice, while affirming as decisive the justificatory process of empirical testing 
(whether in the mode of confirmation or falsification).   
(3) It adopts this justification-based, two-part image of natural scientific practice as a 
model for social scientific practice. 
 
Although there are clear tensions in his work on this point (e.g., Gray, 1989: Chapter 2), 
Popper (1961: 135) appears to subscribe to just such a positivist image and ideal, explicitly 
declaring that his aforementioned view on the nature of scientific practice ‘is not only true for 
the natural but also for the social sciences’. 
 
It has been important to establish the general parameters of this understanding of natural 
scientific practice and its (positivist) relation to social science, because our affirmation of 
retroductive reasoning contests this positivist perspective. Instead, we develop a post-
positivist picture of social science practice, which is capacious enough to accommodate 
poststructuralist, hermeneutic and other non-positivist and anti-positivist approaches to 
research. Of course, positivism has for a long time been criticised by advocates of 
hermeneutics, critical realism, and other perspectives as well. At the same time, some 
approaches, most notably critical realism, have explicitly employed the category of 
retroduction to develop a conception of explanation that rivals the inductive and hypothetico-
deductive-nomological conceptions associated with positivism (Harré, 1961; Bhaskar, 1998; 
Blaikie, 1993, 2000; Sayer, 1983: 116-7). Given that retroduction is a term originally 
countenanced in the domain of natural science, and given that critical realism assumes a 
degree of deep ontological continuity running from the natural to the social world, the 
deployment of the term by critical realists in the social science domain is relatively 
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unproblematic. In contrast, our own argument builds on existing work that affirms a shift in 
ontology from the natural to the social world. Seen in these terms, we thus demand a more 
careful consideration of the conditions for deploying the category of retroduction in 
understanding social science practice. Once accomplished, this will open up a space within 
which to think about a post-positivist understanding of research strategy and methodology, 
relevant not just from the point of view of critical realism, but from the point of view of 
critical social scientific research more generally, inclusive of hermeneutics and 
poststructuralism. 
 
But in order to understand why and how retroduction can be made relevant to critical social 
scientific research, we should begin by understanding the meaning and significance attributed 
to retroduction in the philosophy of natural science. Although Aristotle has been credited 
with its original identification, retroduction has been insightfully described, developed and 
applied in the philosophy of natural science by Charles Sanders Peirce and Norwood Hanson. 
It is to these discussions and debates that we now turn.  
 
Retroduction in Natural Science 
 
One way to get at an initial approximation of the concept of retroduction is to contrast it with 
two competing modes of reasoning – deduction and induction – and to consider how the 
introduction of retroduction thereby raises some important issues about the nature and 
philosophy of science. Charles Sanders Peirce (1960) offers definitions of these three modes 
of reasoning. He begins with deduction, which 
 
is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the 
premises, forms a diagram, of that state of things, perceives in the parts of that 
diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the premises, satisfies itself by mental 
experiments upon the diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least 
would do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or 
probable, truth (Peirce, 1960: 28) 
 
Consider a two-dimensional figure, a triangle for example. This can be understood 
diagrammatically to comprise 3 non-identical, non-parallel, straight lines, all joined at their 
extremities to form one unbroken boundary. A series of ‘mental experiments’ can then be 
made ‘upon the diagram’, which would show that, no matter the variation across different 
triangle diagrams, a particular ‘relation’ between these lines (say, the sum of all its angles) 
‘would always subsist’ (as 180 degrees). By contrast, induction 
 
is that mode of reasoning which adopts a conclusion as approximate, because it 
results from a method of inference which must generally lead to the truth in the long 
run. For example, a ship enters port laden with coffee. I go aboard and sample the 
coffee…. I conclude by induction that the whole cargo has approximately the same 
value per bean as the hundred beans of my sample (Peirce, 1960: 28) 
 
Finally, we can turn to retroduction, which Peirce (1960: 29) understands as ‘the provisional 
adoption of a hypothesis’. Here it is interesting to note that Peirce often uses the term 
hypothesis interchangeably with retroduction. As he puts it, ‘[t]he great difference between 
induction and hypothesis is that the former infers the existence of phenomena such as we 
have observed in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes something of a different 
kind from what we have directly observed, and frequently something which it would be 
 4 
impossible for us to observe directly’ (Peirce, 1960: 385).2 The fact that the hypothesis (H) 
introduces something ‘different in kind’ into the mix is important because it implies that this 
foreign element cannot in any way be induced from observational data, even though it is 
provoked by those observations (P). In other words, the hypothesis cannot be inferred until its 
content is already present in the explanation of P. The philosopher of science Norwood 
Hanson makes a similar point. He highlights the way retroduction contrasts not only with 
inductive accounts, which ‘expect H to emerge from repetitions of P’, but also with H-D 
[hypothetico-deductive] accounts, which ‘make P emerge from some unaccounted-for 
creation of H as a “higher-level hypothesis”’ (Hanson, 1961: 86). In sum, while deductive 
reasoning proves what is the case, and inductive reasoning approximates what is the case, 
retroductive reasoning conjectures what is the case (Peirce in Hanson, 1961: 85). 
 
Having fixed the concept of retroduction, we can now ask what exactly its role has been in 
discussions about the philosophy and sociology of natural science. The simple reply to this 
question is that the concept of retroduction has been invoked primarily as a way to better 
capture the process by which scientists produce hypotheses and construct theories. From the 
point of view of the dichotomous picture of natural scientific practice outlined earlier, the 
primary focus of this debate centres on the context of discovery. Given this context, 
advocates of retroduction contest two positions. The first position is embodied by those who 
claim that the discovery process is best captured by the logic of induction. In contrast to this, 
advocates of retroduction insist that the latter offers a more plausible account of the logic of 
discovery. ‘Physicists rarely find laws by enumerating and summarising observables’, argues 
Hanson. Although ‘they start from data’ scientists form hypotheses whose content exceeds 
those observations (Hanson, 1961: 70). The second position, however, is embodied by those 
who claim that the discovery process has no logic at all or, to put it more modestly, has no 
necessary logic. As Popper (1980: 31) expresses it in one of his formulations, 
 
the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical 
analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new idea 
occurs to a man . . . may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is 
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is concerned not 
with questions of fact . . . but only with questions of justification or validity . . . Its 
questions are of the following kind. Can a statement be justified? And if so, how? Is 
it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it perhaps 
contradict them? . . . Accordingly I shall distinguish sharply between the process of 
conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining it logically. 
 
The question here is whether there is in fact a ‘logic’ to the process of theory construction, in 
which case this process cannot simply be dismissed as whimsical or irrelevant from a 
scientific point of view, as Popper appears to believe. The suggestion by philosophers of 
science like Norwood Hanson is that there is in fact a logic to the process of theory 
construction and the production of hypotheses, and that retroduction, as a mode of reasoning, 
best captures this logic. As Peirce puts it, retroduction is a ‘logical inference, asserting its 
conclusion only problematically, or conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a 
perfectly definite logical form’ (Peirce in Hanson, 1961: 86). Though more open-ended than 
deduction and induction, retroduction describes a non-trivial, distinctive mode of reasoning. 
Moreover, not only does an appeal to retroduction better describe the way scientists go about 
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their business, but it also supplies a corrective to the way scientific practices are understood 
by philosophers and sociologists of natural science. 
 
This completes our account of the role retroduction plays in discussions and debates in the 
philosophy and sociology of natural science. To understand what role retroduction can play 
in the philosophy and sociology of social sciences, it is important to highlight how, despite 
Popper’s and Reichenbach’s opposing views regarding the demarcation criterion of natural 
science (deduction versus induction), and despite Hanson’s and others’ opposing views 
regarding theory construction (the logic of retroduction versus the logic of induction versus 
no logic at all), all are united in maintaining the two-part picture of science introduced by 
Reichenbach, comprising the contexts of discovery and justification. At first sight, of course, 
this suggests that the usefulness of retroductive reasoning in helping us to generate a new 
model of explanation in social and political analysis is potentially limited due to its restriction 
to the process of theory-construction and thus the context of discovery. In order to show that 
the value of retroduction in the social sciences is broader than this, we shall contest the sharp 
distinction that is drawn between the contexts of discovery and justification. This, then, is the 
task of the next section. 
 
 
Retroduction in Social Studies: From ‘externality’ to ‘internality’ 
 
The argument about how and why the maintenance of a stark separation between the contexts 
of discovery and justification is unsustainable in the social sciences rests on a premise shared 
by many who contest the use of the causal law paradigm in social science research. This 
premise can be cast in terms of a ‘minimal’ hermeneutical constraint imposed on any social 
science explanation. In this view, any explanation of a social phenomenon must ‘pass 
through’ (i.e., take into account in a non-trivial way) the self-interpretations of the actors 
engaged in affected practices, even if such explanations are not reducible to those self-
interpretations (Glynos and Howarth, 2008: 21). The idea that self-interpretations should be 
seen as both necessary for and constitutive of a social science explanation is embraced by a 
wide range of traditions, including hermeneutics, critical realism, and poststructuralism; but it 
also resonates strongly with a number of frequently expressed reasons to be sceptical about 
maintaining methodological continuity across the natural and social science, or to put it 
differently, about sustaining a strong separation between the contexts of discovery and 
justification. These reasons variously emphasize: 
 
(1) the centrality of self-interpretations in the social world;  
(2) the irreducibility and complexity of context in attributing sense and significance to 
‘data’ against which hypotheses are tested; 
(3) the contestability of the ontological presuppositions necessarily brought to bear when 
self-interpretations and data are subjected to interpretation.   
 
In what follows, we offer one version of the argument that there is a ‘minimal hermeneutic’ 
constraint in the social and human sciences, which challenges the positivist image of science 
in which there is a clear separation of discovery and justification, and a prioritisation of  the 
latter. We suggest that this dualistic picture, and the causal paradigm that it sustains, relies on 
the (contestable) idea that the relationship between a process (whether social or natural) and 
its context is understood to be ‘external’. Instead, we argue that, unlike many cases in the 
natural science field, a social process and its context should be seen (presumptively) as co-
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constitutive and, in this sense, ‘internal’ (e.g. Putnam, 1987; 1988; Marttila, 2016: Chapter 
5). 
 
We can elaborate upon this argument by examining first how the causal law model informs 
our understanding of processes in the natural world. The basic intuition can be stated simply: 
the way a causal sequence or process functions in the natural world is understood to be 
independent of the meaning of that process. The way the law of gravity operates, for 
example, is independent of what you or I think of it. The moment, however, the meaning of a 
process becomes a key part of how it functions, its status as a causal law is put into question. 
And this is precisely what happens when we move from the natural world to the social world. 
 
Using the law of gravity to explain why an apple falls to the ground implies that the law and 
the context have an ‘external’ relation to one another. That is to say, changes in the context 
do not change the way the law functions (i.e. the identity of the natural process). Changes in 
the context only change the outcomes or effects of the natural process (causal law). I may 
hold the apple at a greater height, then at a lower height. This variation of contextual 
conditions can be used as a way of ‘testing’ the law treated as a hypothetical law, or the law – 
now detached from its context of discovery – can be used to explain the variation in 
outcomes as a function of the variation of context. The essential point here is that, in many 
natural science scenarios, the relation between natural process and context is treated as 
‘external’. References to the causal law paradigm invariably seek to capture this aspect of the 
relationship between process and context. 
 
Of course, the relationship between natural processes and context may often be very complex 
and impossible to disentangle. Biologists, for example, are always at pains to emphasize 
complexity, often making it impossible to sufficiently control for contextual factors 
sufficiently in our attempts to determine the identity of a causal law. The presumption of 
‘externality’, however, remains intact. And it is this relation of ‘externality’ that is central to 
maintaining the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification. This is 
important from the point of view of a justification-centred, two-part image of social scientific 
practice, because it is only insofar as a posited hypothesis can be fully extracted 
(‘externalised’) from one context (the context of discovery), that it can then be properly and 
independently tested in another (the context of justification). 
 
In the social world, however, social processes do not have the status of causal laws because 
their relation to context is not external. More specifically, social processes and context are 
mediated by subjects and their meanings. Processes and contextual factors are treated as 
relational features that over-determine one another, rather than discrete as atoms that have an 
external relation to one another. This ontological difference has capital consequences. It 
means, in particular, that the very identity and operation of a social process is context-
dependent. It is not merely the outcome or effects of a social process that are context-
dependent. The very identity and functioning of the social process is at stake here: the posited 
social process is dependent on the context of its operation, and the context of its operation is 
dependent on the meanings attributed to it by the relevant subjects. But if the identity and 
operation of a hypothesized social process cannot be clearly severed from the contextual-
signifying features of its discovery, these features will have some role to play in the context 
of justification (i.e. the posited social process cannot be simply detached or ‘externalised’ 
from the context of discovery). In the social world, therefore, the boundary between contexts 
of discovery and justification is blurred, and this points to the need to abandon the positivist 
image of social science practice. This suggests we should opt instead for a more capacious, 
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post-positivist image of social science practice, in which meaning is acknowledged to have a 
constitutive role to play in the identity and operation of social processes. 
  
In this view, appealing to a social process to explain a phenomenon (e.g., why a particular 
state has a two party system) is not the same as using the law of gravitation to explain why an 
apple falls to the ground. The difference between these two types of explanation resides in 
the role that subjectivity and meaning play in mediating the process at stake and the 
contextual features within which it is operative. Even where political scientists claim to have 
established laws or ‘strong probabilistic tendencies’ – Duverger’s law or Roberto Michels’s 
‘iron law of oligarchy’ for example – it is possible to show how they in fact offer often rather 
nuanced meaning-mediated and context-dependent analyses. In short, the covering-law model 
‘reflectively misunderstands the logic of political explanations’ (Farr, 1987: 61), while a 
post-positivist picture better captures the character of social processes, as well as the way 
many social science scholars think and talk and analyse social processes. 
 
Such a post-positivist image points to reasons why prediction – the holy grail of positivist 
social science practice – is so fraught with difficulties. However, from the point of view of 
the post-positivist perspective we are sketching out, the sources of these difficulties are not 
merely empirical, but also ontological. It is certainly true that predictions in the social world 
are dependent on the beliefs of subjects and that such predictions are therefore as fragile or as 
stable as those beliefs are. However, this sort of fragility – or temporary stability –  is 
something that can be readily accommodated by means of probabilistic-statistical forms of 
calculation and prediction. There is, however, a ‘second-order’ fragility that we can add to 
this, whose source is the subject’s capacity for second-order reflexivity frequently 
emphasized by those who take seriously a hermeneutical ontology (cf. Glynos and Howarth, 
2007: 220-1, note 21; Marttila, 2016: Ch. 5; Zienkowski, 2017). Such second order 
reflexivity generates paradoxical effects familiar to most social scientists aiming to deliver 
robust predictions: the so-called ‘feedback effects’ (Jervis 1997) or ‘looping effects’ 
(Hacking, 1995). These paradoxical effects point to the contingency that is introduced into an 
object of investigation, as soon as its logic, predicted behaviour, or character - however 
probabilistic in character or however reasonable its underlying rationale - is made public and 
thus accessible to the subjects being studied.3 Consider, for example, cases of so-called ‘self-
fulfilling’ and ‘self-defeating’ prophecies. As an example of a ‘self-defeating’ prophecy 
imagine a dictum which states that queues in theme parks peak on bank holidays. This would 
exemplify the case of a self-defeating prophecy if the wide dissemination of the dictum 
served to provide a good number of people with a reason to avoid theme parks on bank 
holidays. Acting on such knowledge would thus produce a new and contrary dictum stating 
that queues in theme parks shrink on bank holidays. In other words, in the social sciences the 
contextual features – including the self-interpretations of the relevant social actors – serve as 
conditions of possibility of behavioural patterns that are strongly bound up with the content, 
and therefore the meaning and significance, of the hypotheses and explanations themselves. 
 
                                                        
3 The openness and fragile character of the social world, however, does not entail abandoning the explanatory 
aims of social science. An emphasis on possibility, as opposed to probability, makes it possible to disarticulate 
prediction from explanation. For this reason scholars such as Bhaskar affirm the aims of social science to ‘be 
explanatory and non-predictive. (Particularly important here will be the capacity of a theory (or research 
programme) to be developed in a non-ad hoc way so as to situate, and preferably explain, without strain, a 
possibility once (and perhaps even before) it is realized, when it could never, given the openness of the social 
world, have predicted it.)’ (Bhaskar, 1998: 46) 
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Of course, these second order reflexivity effects can produce a desire to generate predictions 
that are ‘publicity-proof’ or ‘publication-proof’. But it can also produce a more questionable 
desire, namely, to keep such predictions from public view. As Connolly (1981: 20) observes, 
from this perspective 
 
to render the predictions reliable the expert is encouraged to keep established 
correlations outside the sphere of public discourse. For given the reflexive 
capacities of the human objects of inquiry, widespread awareness of the antecedents 
of their own behaviour might provoke them to revise future patterns of conduct. The 
awareness could diminish both the ability to test the law-like claim (since one of its 
preconditions has changed) and the ability to use the knowledge effectively in social 
policy. 
  
What both first order and second order fragility have in common is the idea that subjects both 
can know their beliefs and have the capacity to adjust them in light of new information and in 
line with their ideals and objectives. At the very least, then, we could say that unlike the 
natural sciences, so-called laws and explanations in the social sciences are inextricably tied to 
the subjects they purport to cover, such that hypotheses comprise both explanatory elements 
and the conditions under which these explanations hold. In addition, however, we could say 
here that a poststructuralist perspective points to a more ‘radical’ contingency and thus a third 
order fragility, beyond the second order fragility that a hermeneutical perspective makes 
apparent, linked to the constitutively incomplete or open character of belief systems as such. 
This generates effects which are not necessarily easily distinguishable from the second order 
effects we have described above, but it does seek to (quasi-transcendentally) account for such 
effects in terms of our negative, anti-essentialist ontology.  
 
An important objective of this section was to offer reasons to doubt the stark separation 
between the contexts of discovery and justification presupposed by positivist approaches to 
social science research, suggesting that a key source of these reasons lies in the distinctive 
ontologies underpinning the natural and social worlds.4 We are now in a position to discharge 
its other objective, namely, to draw out the implications of this exercise from the point of 
view of retroduction. Retroduction was irrelevant from the point of view of justification, 
which was understood to follow a different logic. Since, however, the autonomy of the two 
contexts of discovery and justification is not sustainable in a social science context, 
retroduction becomes relevant to both contexts and must therefore be understood to partake 
in the entire arc of social scientific practice. In contrast to the two-part picture of positivist 
social science, comprising a logic of scientific discovery followed by a logic of justification 
made up of exhaustive empirical testing, we suggest it is better to conceive of social science 
practice as entailing one overarching logic of investigation – what we call a ‘retroductive 
cycle’.5  
                                                        
4 As far as this essay is concerned, we are agnostic as to whether the stark separation between contexts of 
discovery and justification is sustainable even in the natural sciences. Our argument does not rely on this. Our 
argument takes as its target a particular image of doing natural science that is deployed rather rigidly to frame 
our understanding social science practice, irrespective of whether this image stands up to scrutiny. We have 
adduced reasons about why this image is not appropriate when applied to the social sciences, but this does not 
preclude the possibility of adducing reasons that contest the suitability of this image even for characterizing 
natural science practice, particularly when one considers how heterogeneous and expansive this field is, 
extending well-beyond Newtonian physics as the stereotypical image of natural science. 
5 In our book, we conceptualize the cycle in terms of a meta-methodological logic comprising three 
overdetermined activities: problematizing empirical phenomena; accounting for these phenomena; and 
persuading – and/or intervening into – the relevant community and practices of scholars and practitioners. Thus, 
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Retroduction is understood as a cycle – a kind of restless ‘spiral’– because as we move from 
one ‘moment’ to the next, and back again, revising aspects of our account in light of 
adjustments made in other moments, we never return to the same spot.6 A post-positivist ‘one 
logic’ picture suggests that there is an essential relation of over-determination – and to-and-
fro movement – between each moment of the social science research process. This is in no 
small part because the persuasive aspect of justification extends to the task of convincing the 
relevant audience about the way a research problem was characterized (or re-characterized) 
in offering an explanatory account in the first place, pointing us back to the context of 
discovery. This contrasts with positivism’s two-part picture of social science research 
practice, which treats processes of discovery and justification as entirely autonomous and 
separate from one another, but where strict adherence to a logic of justification (usually in 
terms of a carefully defined ‘testing’ methodology) can deliver robust and stable judgements 
in a way that is not at all dependent on the process of discovery. 
 
Implications for Research Strategy  
 
A rejection of the stark boundary between the contexts of discovery and justification, 
however, does not entail rejecting the use of the terms discovery and justification, no more 
than it does entail rejecting other terms associated with the positivist framework. It only 
transforms their meanings and significance. Justification is still crucial, and robust social 
science research is still something that can and should be espoused, but the status and 
meaning of the elements of justification shift when viewed through a post-positivist lens. In 
this view, the basic elements of justification remain the same, but the choices we make in 
relation to those elements are no longer governed by the narrow epistemological-cum-
methodological imperative to produce and/or test falsifiable predictions. Elements of 
justification are thus interpreted in line with research purposes that can range far beyond 
these particular epistemological objectives, to include those that are ineliminably historical, 
ontological, political, and ethical. Such a shift in objectives will generate shifts in the 
meaning and status of terms such as ‘least likely’ or ‘most likely’ when justifying the 
selection of a suitable ‘test case’, for example. Likewise, the meaning and status of case 
selection qualifiers such as ‘extreme’, ‘deviant’, or ‘paradigmatic’, can and will vary 
enormously as a function of presupposed ontological commitments, as well as the uses to 
which they can be put, be they to generalize, elucidate, reveal, critique, or emancipate. And 
what we say here in relation to case selection can be said also in relation to any number of 
other elements of justification, including case organization, corpus selection, the reliability of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the practices of persuasion cannot – except heuristically – stand outside the retroductive cycle (cf. Glynos and 
Howarth, 2017: Chapter 1). 
6 The idea of ‘retroductive cycle’ differs from the notion of a ‘hermeneutic circle’ (cf. Shklar, 2004[1986]) in a 
number of important respects. First, the term cycle, as opposed to circle, emphasizes how each moment of 
relative equilibrium reached in the to-and-fro movement of retroduction is always a ‘return’ to a different point, 
thus pointing to an inherent openness in the process. A ‘hermeneutical circle’, in contrast, can sometimes carry 
with it the connotation of a closed or asymptotically ‘final’ or ‘correct’ interpretive fit between text and context. 
Second, the qualifier ‘retroductive’, at least as we have adapted it to a social science context, explicitly links 
hypothesis to problematization and persuasion, foregrounding the role played by ontology and subjectivity, 
often under-emphasized when thinking about interpretation predominantly in terms of the relation between text 
and context. Finally, the idea of a ‘retroductive cycle’ aspires to capture a process that is not exclusive to those 
found in the hermeneutical tradition, but whose scope of application is relevant also for other traditions of 
thought in social science that are critical of the causal law paradigm, including critical realist and 
poststructuralist traditions. 
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data and choice of methodological techniques, the validity of inferences, and the style of 
presentation itself.  
 
Elements of justification are thus formulated and rearticulated in each ‘moment’ of the 
retroductive cycle in a way that demonstrates how they are over-determined by aspects of the 
discovery process.7 While social scientists wedded to the causal law paradigm may disagree 
about whether findings verify or falsify predictions, post-positivist social scientists 
understand they are caught in an expansive retroductive cycle, where disagreement is about 
the very meaning and significance of findings, thus demanding critical engagement with the 
process of problematization itself, not to mention the ontological and normative 
commitments informing the way problematized phenomena should be characterized. A post-
positivist image of social science practice thus paints a strikingly capacious conception of 
justification and testing.8 It is for this reason that we have argued that, from the point of view 
of a logic of retroduction operating in a social science context, ‘the single most important 
criterion for admitting a hypothesis, however tentatively,’ is simply that ‘it accounts for the 
phenomenon or problem at stake.’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 26). In this view, an account 
is accepted as a valid explanation when its criteria can be publicly articulated and justified – 
criteria concerning evidence, consistency, exhaustiveness, and so on. The unsettling aspect of 
this post-positivist approach, of course, is that such criteria are themselves subject to 
interpretation and contestation, since they presuppose a set of commitments that cannot be 
resolved by appealing to ontologically and normatively neutral epistemological tests. Nothing 
outside the collective process of judgement-making – not even the most sophisticated 
methodological techniques – can guarantee its outcome. 
 
Thus the idea of a retroductive cycle foregrounds how justification does not emerge 
‘naturally’ or ‘straightforwardly out of the methods and techniques we deploy in our 
research. Processes of justification themselves fold back into processes of re-
problematizations, which re-inform and over-determine the purposes, strategies, and methods 
of our research, including our selection from, and use of, a sizeable and heterogeneous set of 
techniques, including discourse analytic, rhetorical, ethnographic, participatory, psycho-
social, perspectival, corpus-linguistic, statistical, experimental, and survey-based techniques. 
From a poststructuralist point of view, the setting up of research strategies demand familiarity 
with a wide range of methods and techniques, but it also demands we engage in a sustained 
practice of reactivation, deconstruction, commensuration, and articulation. Without first 
carefully disembedding reified ontological and normative deposits in various methods and 
techniques that we seek to appropriate, we run the risk of reproducing their biases. 
  
Generalization and comparison also comprise key elements of the justification process and 
for this reason do not escape the orbit of an expanded retroductive cycle. From our 
perspective, generalization and comparison are made possible through shared paradigms, 
theoretical concepts and ontological presuppositions. Importantly, however, they cannot be 
divorced from the moment of problematization, which is intimately connected to the 
                                                        
7 The concept of articulation is a crucial concept in poststructuralist discourse theory. Although it plays an 
important role in understanding the logic of the retroductive cycle, this has not been developed in detail in this 
chapter, largely due to space limitations. (See Glynos and Howarth (2007: Chapter 6) for a detailed treatment of 
this concept).  
8 A post-positivist understanding of testing can, of course, incorporate experimental, statistical, and other 
mathematical techniques normally associated with natural science practice. It simply does not assign these 
methodological techniques any presumptive epistemological privilege that somehow allows them to ‘escape’ the 
orbit of the retroductive cycle (cf. Topper, 2005: 192-4). 
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(contestable) purposes to which we put generalization and comparison. Generalization and 
comparison takes place on the basis of shared judgements about theoretical terms, about 
paradigms, and about what constitute cases that converge or diverge from paradigm cases. 
The way paradigms shed light is not straightforward because it requires that we articulate the 
networks of similarities and differences through a series of comparisons, justifying the claim 
to a generalized family resemblance in both theoretical and contextual terms. What makes 
possible the simultaneous singularity and generalisability of each case is the background 
theoretical framework and ontology informing the analysis, coupled with the practice of 
articulation. We explicitly couch explanatory accounts in theoretical terms, which find 
expression in different contexts, because they emerge out of our presupposed ontological 
horizon, and thus common theoretical language. This means we can formulate more general 
questions and hypotheses that invite further comparative research. We might ask, for 
example, how the specific logic we have identified in our research, such as the logic of the 
supermarket, might function as a paradigm in articulating and characterizing market practices 
in the health care sector. 
 
One general implication of the post-positivist picture of the social science research process in 
terms of an overarching logic of retroduction is to highlight the fragile and rather volatile 
character of the ‘matter’ and ‘knowledge’ of the social world, related not only to the sheer 
complexity of social life, but also to the peculiar role that human subjectivity plays in social 
science explanation, namely, that humans are simultaneously the objects and subjects of 
knowledge – something Foucault captured with the expression ‘empirico-transcendental 
doublet’ (Foucault, 2004[1966]: 347). This complexity, co-constitutivity, and constitutive 
openness can be expressed more formally by appealing to the way some philosophers of 
social science draw a contrast between positivist and post-positivist forms of inference. To 
paraphrase Jon Elster, if a positivist covering-law explanation of an event, E, entails 
establishing the presence of conditions C1, C2,… Cn, then a post-positivist empirical claim 
would take the form ‘If C1, C2, . . . Cn obtain, then sometimes E’ (Elster, 1999: 5; emphasis 
added). This ‘sometimes’ is crucial, playing havoc with anyone’s aspiration to discover in the 
social world a causal law akin to gravitation. It expresses in a formal way the constitutively 
fragile character of the social world, highlighting the prima-facie centrality of case-based 
thick-descriptive attention to situational features, in part due to their internal relation to social 
processes, in part due to their essentially incomplete character. It implies that any social 
science account can only ever aspire to an equilibrium that is reflectively and constitutively 
temporary and unstable. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The importance of retroduction to researchers drawing on an anti-essentialist ontology and 
sensibility is that it offers scholars a language with which to construct a counter-narrative to 
the way positivism’s suspect image of scientific practice has come to dominate many parts of 
the social science academy. Retroduction helps us to both relativize and question the 
assumption that our modes of reasoning in all forms of scientific practice are exhausted by 
induction and deduction. Equally, poststructuralist discourse theory, and anti-essentialist 
approaches to social and political research more generally, are not simply counter-posed to 
positivist perspectives. Instead, they can also form a chain of equivalence with other post-
positivist approaches. Indeed, what poststructuralist discourse theory can share with other 
strands of hermeneutics, critical realism, and even neo-positivism, is a retroductive 
understanding of how social science is conducted – whether in practice, in theory, or both. 
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The retroductive cycle thus offers a fruitful way of framing the research process, particularly 
as regards strategy and methodology. 
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